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Abstract. The keyed sponge is a well-accepted method for message authentication. It
processes data at a certain rate by sequential evaluation of an underlying permutation.
If the key size k is smaller than the rate, currently known bounds are tight, but if it
exceeds the rate, state of the art only dictates security up to 2k/2. We take closer
inspection at the key prediction security of the sponge and close the remaining gap
in the existing security analysis: we confirm key security up to close to 2k, regardless
of the rate. The result impacts all applications of the keyed sponge and duplex that
process at a rate smaller than the key size, including the STROBE protocol framework,
as well as the related constructions such as HMAC-SHA-3 and the sandwich sponge.
Keywords: outer-keyed sponge · full-keyed sponge · key prediction · graph-based
proof
1 Introduction
Keyed cryptographic functions are desired to “behave like” a random function with the
same interface, in such a way that an adversary cannot easily distinguish one from
another. Almost all keyed cryptographic schemes have been analyzed in this so-called
indistinguishability model, at least from a generic perspective where the underlying
primitives are assumed to be sufficiently secure. The indistinguishability model is rather
strong: an attack grants an adversary knowledge on some evaluations of the scheme, but
not all. It does not automatically produce a full break of the scheme, but rather indicates
a non-random property.
Key recoveries are a stronger type of attack. A key recovery can be used to distinguish
a scheme from random, but not necessarily the other way around. In some cases, the best
distinguishability attack is (close to) a key recovery attack. For example, AES [FIP99]
supports keys of size 128, 192, or 256 bits, and the best distinguishing attack on AES
known to date is (close to) the generic key recovery attack that succeeds if the attacker
makes a total amount of 2k oﬄine evaluations of AES, where k is the key size. In a bit
more detail, it is generally believed that the strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP)
security of AES is around t/2k, where t is the number of oﬄine evaluations of AES.
It is not always straightforward to achieve security against key recovery attacks up to
2k. An earlier example of this is the authenticated encryption scheme McOE-X [FFL12], for
which Mendel et al. [MMRT12] described a simple key recovery attack in 2n/2 evaluations,
where n equals both key and state size. Fuhr et al. [FLS15] described sophisticated
birthday-type key recovery attacks on CAESAR candidates Marble [Guo14] and AEZ
v3 [HKR14]. The designers of AEZ revised their scheme to AEZ v4 in order to mitigate
the attack [HKR15a], but subsequently, Chaigneau and Gilbert [CG16] showed that AEZ
v4.1 [HKR15b] is still vulnerable to a key recovery attack with similar complexity.
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1.1 Keyed Sponges
We will focus on keyed versions of the sponge construction by Bertoni et al. [BDPV07].
The (keyless) sponge construction is a hash function mode that operates on a b-bit state,
split into an inner part of capacity c and an outer part of rate r, where c+ r = b. Data
is absorbed, and the digest is extracted, block-by-block via the outer part of the state,
interleaved with evaluations of a b-bit permutation pi. The function is proven [BDPV08] to
achieve c/2-bit security in the indifferentiability framework [MRH04]. It has been adopted,
among others, in the SHA-3 hashing standard [FIP15].
The first, and perhaps simplest, approach of transforming the sponge into a pseudoran-
dom function (PRF) is by Bertoni et al. [BDPV11c], who suggested to simply prepend the
message m with the key K, i.e., to evaluate the sponge on input (K‖m). The scheme got
renewed analysis by Andreeva et al. [ADMV15], who dubbed it the “outer-keyed sponge
(OKS),” and later Naito and Yasuda [NY16]. OKS is depicted in Figure 1.
Alternatively, one can design a PRF by just initializing the inner part with the key
K instead of with 0c. This construction, now known as the “inner-keyed sponge (IKS),”
was introduced by Chang et al. [CDH+12] and received improved analysis by Andreeva et
al. [ADMV15] and Naito and Yasuda [NY16].
Finally, it appeared that secrecy of the state after key injection could be used to support
full-state absorption: instead of absorbing data in the r-bit outer part only, one could
absorb over the entire b-bit state. The idea appeared first in the donkeySponge [BDPV12].
An analysis for one output block only was given by Gaži et al. [GPT15a]. A complete
security treatment of the “full-keyed sponge (FKS)” was given by Mennink et al. [MRV15]
and Daemen et al. [DMV17]. FKS is depicted in Figure 1.
Generically, in terms of the number of permutation evaluations,1 the full-keyed sponge
is more efficient than the outer-keyed and inner-keyed sponge: data is absorbed b bits at a
time rather than r < b bits. From a security perspective, the modes achieve approximately
the same level of security. In detail, all achieve a security level of around
M2
2c +
MN
2c +Adv
key-pre
F (N) (1)
(omitting constants and details, see Section 4), where M denotes the query complexity
to the construction (in terms of the number of underlying primitive calls), N the query
complexity to the underlying permutation, and Advkey-preF (N) is the probability that
the adversary made queries to the underlying permutation that match the key input to
F ∈ {OKS, IKS,FKS}. Intuitively, the first two terms of (1) correspond to distinguishing
F from a random function, and the last term represents a key prediction, an isolated event
in typical security analyses (there is a subtle difference between a key prediction and a key
recovery, as we will explain in Section 5).
Note that all sponges achieve a security level of c bits at best, and there is no reason
to take a key of size k > c. As such, FKS has made IKS obsolete: both require adaptation
of the keyless sponge algorithm, both take one evaluation of pi to absorb the key, both
are approximately equally secure, but the FKS is more efficient. FKS does not necessarily
make OKS obsolete: although it is less efficient, OKS does not require an adaptation of
the keyless sponge algorithm, and can evaluate it in a black-box manner. This happens,
for example, in the STROBE protocol framework [Ham17a,Ham17b], as we will elaborate
upon in Section 1.4. We restrict our focus to OKS and FKS.
1The full-keyed sponge would need a permutation with more rounds in order to compensate for the
increased adversarial power.
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1.2 Key Prediction Security
For FKS, using that k < b without loss of generality, it is easy to see that
Advkey-preFKS (N) ≤ N/2k . (2)
Indeed, the key is absorbed using one evaluation of pi, the adversary can make N attempts,
and succeeds if one of those is performed for the corresponding key.
For OKS, the k-bit key is partitioned into r-bit blocks. If k ≤ r, then the key prediction
term is bounded as before (the key is absorbed using one call to pi). On the other hand,
if k > r, then the key is processed using more than one evaluation of pi, and the current
state of the art suggests only 2k/2 security. In more detail, Gaži et al. [GPT15b, Lemma
12] (full version of [GPT15a]) derived the following bound for the key prediction term:
Advkey-preOKS (N) .
{
N/2k , if k ≤ r ,
bλ/2N/2k/2 , if k > r ,
(3)
where λ := dk/re denotes the number of permutation calls to process the key, and where
negligible terms are omitted (refer to Proposition 1 for the details).
This bound shows a counter-intuitive and devastating loss in the key size: whereas one
key block still yields the intuitively optimal bound of N/2k (“one needs to make around
2k attempts to recover the key”), once the key size exceeds the rate one loses half the key!
The conclusion is that the bound of (3) is, obviously, non-tight.
In Section 3, we derive an improved bound on the key prediction security, and demon-
strate that
Advkey-preOKS (N) . cλ−1N/2k , (4)
where, again, λ := dk/re, and negligible terms are omitted (refer to Theorem 1 for the
details). For k ≤ r (or λ = 1), the earlier bound of Gaži et al. was already tight and the
new bound matches it. For k > r (or λ > 1), our bound demonstrates that close to k-bit
security is achieved, with a logarithmic degradation in c. This innocent logarithmic loss,
in turn, comes from the probability of a lucky multi-collision; it was already present in the
bound of Gaži et al., but we slightly improved it. (We remark that the best attack against
key prediction has a success probability of around N/2k.)
The result is proven using a graph-based approach, wherein every edge corresponds to an
r-bit key block guess and one considers the maximum number of paths of length λ departing
from root node 0b. We then consider configurations of paths of length λ, corresponding to
the direction in which the λ individual queries to the underlying permutation are made.
The proof is inspired by that of Gaži et al. [GPT15b, Lemma 12], who also adopted a
graph-based approach and introduced the term of configurations, yet it differs in many
aspects. Most importantly, Gaži et al. observed that in any configuration, at least half is
in the same direction (either forward or inverse). They subsequently use a bad event based
on multi-collisions to upper bound the number of possibilities over these ≥ λ/2 edges, but
ignore the problem of the adversary to find the connections over the remaining ≤ λ/2
edges in reverse direction. This simplification leads to discarding half of the key (hence
the denominator 2k/2 in (3)). In our bound, we perform an inductive argument on λ. We
prove that for every added layer extension, the size of the yield, or equivalently the number
of paths from 0b, depends only on the presence of multi-collisions and is independent of
the configuration of the query.
1.3 Further Appearances of Key Prediction Security
The main functionality of the keyed sponge is authentication. It can be used for (authenti-
cated) encryption via the duplex construction by Bertoni et al. [BDPV11a]. The duplex is
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a stateful construction: a call to its initialization interface initializes a state, and a call to
its duplexing interface absorbs a data block, applies the permutation pi on the state, and
squeezes at most r bits. Similar to the keyed sponges, the absorption of the data block can
be performed over the outer part only (r bits) or over the entire state (b bits). We will
refer to these two as the outer-keyed duplex (OKD) and the full-keyed duplex (FKD). It
is important to note that these protocols do not extract data during absorption of the key;
in other words, the key is absorbed as if the function is an outer-keyed, resp. full-keyed,
sponge.
The security of keyed duplexes can be proven from keyed sponges and vice versa [MRV15,
DMV17]. The reduction makes use of the fact that one evaluation of the keyed duplex
consists of ` evaluations of a keyed sponge, where ` denotes the number of blocks that are
duplexed in-between two initialization calls. Even stronger, both the outer-keyed duplex
and full-keyed duplex are proven to also achieve the bound of (1), up to constant, where
the key prediction security is still for the keyed sponge function F ∈ {OKS,FKS}.
For both variants of the keyed sponges and keyed duplexes one can also consider security
in the nonce-respecting setting, where a nonce is absorbed into the state prior to the first
data block. In this case, the general bound of (1) can go down to around
M2
2b +
N
2c +Adv
key-pre
F (N) , (5)
using techniques of [JLM14,DMV17] (see also Section 4). Common term in the bounds of
(1) and (5) is the presence of the term Advkey-preF (N) for F ∈ {OKS,FKS}. Our improved
analysis of Advkey-preOKS (N) in (4) immediately yields an improved bound for the outer-keyed
duplex, as well as for the nonce-respecting variants of both the outer-keyed sponge and
duplex.
Beyond the keyed sponges and keyed duplexes, key prediction security also appears in
the analyses of HMAC-SHA-3 [NW16] and the sandwich sponge [Nai16]. In these works,
the authors adopted the old bound of Gaži et al. of (3). Our new bound of (4) directly
improves the security bounds of these schemes.
1.4 Application
Despite that FKS generically improves over OKS both from a security as an efficiency
perspective, there are still reasons to resort to OKS. First, the security results only focus
on the generic construction: full-state absorption allows the adversary more power, and
the underlying permutation may likely need more rounds. Second, the usage of OKS is
conceptually simpler: the PRF can be implemented using the keyless sponge algorithm as
a black-box.
1.4.1 STROBE
This exact idea lies at the heart of the STROBE protocol framework [Ham17a,Ham17b]. It
is designed on top of the sponge construction, and extends the use of a single permutation
to a lightweight framework for network protocols, that allows for (keyless) hashing, authen-
ticated encryption, authentication, pseudorandom number generation, and many more. In
order to allow for a simple framework with extremely small code size, all functionalities
supported by STROBE operate on the outer part only. In particular, STROBE does not
allow for full-state absorption but rather absorbs key and data in the outer part.
The STROBE protocol framework is based on SHAKE [NIS16] and supports instantia-
tions with various widths, as indicated in Table 1. Whereas the larger STROBEs have
k ≤ r, the more lightweight STROBE-128/400 has suggested key size larger than r. The
same applies to “STROBE lite” on 200-bits state (which is not included in the table). Our
analysis confirms that these instantiations do achieve the claimed level of security and
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Table 1: Suggested parameters in the STROBE protocol framework [Ham17a,Ham17b].
scheme b c r k
STROBE-128/1600 1600 256 1344 256
STROBE-256/1600 1600 512 1088 256
STROBE-128/800 800 256 544 256
STROBE-256/800 800 512 288 256
STROBE-128/400 400 256 144 256
that the effective key length is not halved (as suggested by the earlier bound of (3)). We
remark that the 256-bit key size in the STROBE protocol framework is a mere suggestion
by the author; implementers may opt to use a larger or smaller key.
1.4.2 CAESAR Competition
Multiple submissions to the CAESAR competition for the development of a portfolio of
authenticated encryption schemes [CAE18] adopted the keyed duplex. Focusing on the
third round candidates, Table 2 lists the parameters (b, c, r, k) of the four sponge-based
schemes Ascon [DEMS16], Ketje [BDP+16a], Keyak [BDP+16b], and NORX [AJN16].
Keyak implements the full-keyed duplex construction of [DMV17] and the original key
prediction bound of (2) applies. The remaining three schemes evaluate the outer-keyed
duplex, with one twist: despite that message is absorbed in the outer part only, the key
is absorbed in a full-state fashion. For example, for Ascon-128, the 128-bit key is used
(alongside the initialization vector and nonce) to initialize the 320-bit state, and departing
from that state, the outer-keyed duplex (with rate r = 64) is evaluated. Therefore, also
for these schemes the original key prediction bound of (2) applies. Our observations
nevertheless demonstrate that if, for some reason, full-state absorption of the key is
infeasible, multi-round outer part absorption does not degrade security.
1.4.3 Lightweight Permutations
Our analysis improves over the existing bounds for OKS in case the key size exceeds the
rate. It becomes particularly relevant in the context of lightweight cryptography and the
current abundance in “small” permutations, all with different features. Whereas most allow
for a large enough capacity and rate so that key absorption takes only one round (typically
permutations of size ≥ 384 bits, including Keccak-f [400] [BDPV11b], C-Quark [AHMN10],
SPONGENT-256/256/128 [BKL+11], and Gimli [BKL+17]), some have a smaller state,
such as 228-bit Photon-256/32/32 [GPP11], 320-bit Ascon [DEMS16], 200- or 280-bits
PRIMATEs [ABB+14], and 128- or 256-bits Prøst [KLL+14]. If the rate is too small and
one does not opt to simply initialize the state using the key (as, e.g., described for Ascon
above), key absorption is necessarily performed in multiple rounds.
2 Preliminaries
For a finite set S, we denote by s $←− S the uniform random sampling of s from S. For a
natural number b ∈ N, {0, 1}b denotes the set of b-bit strings, and perm(b) denotes the set
of all permutations pi : {0, 1}b → {0, 1}b. We denote by {0, 1}∗ the set of all strings. For
m ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote by m1, . . . ,mν ="b(m) the two-step process of (i) appending m
with 10−|m|−1 mod b, and (ii) partitioning the resulting string into ν ≥ 1 strings of b bits.
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Table 2: Parameters of the four sponge-based round 3 CAESAR candidates. For Ketje
and Keyak, we have taken the recommended key length.
scheme b c r k
Ascon [DEMS16] 320 256 64 128
320 192 128 128
Ketje [BDP+16a] 200 184 16 92
400 368 32 128
Keyak [BDP+16b] 800 256 544 128..224
1600 256 1344 128..224
NORX [AJN16] 512 128 384 128
1024 256 768 256
For a b-bit string m ∈ {0, 1}b and values c, r ∈ N such that c, r ≤ b, we denote by bmcc
the c rightmost bits of m and by dmer the r leftmost bits of m.
An adversary A‰ is a computationally unbounded algorithm that is given adaptive
access to an oracle ‰ and outputs certain data. It wins if its output fulfills a (possibly
randomized) winning condition W. The queries that A makes are typically recorded in a
transcript Q. If ‰ ∈ perm(b), such a transcript Q consists of a finite amount of tuples
(C, s, t), where s is the input to the permutation, t the output of the permutation, and
C ∈ {0, 1} the query direction (0 for forward and 1 for inverse). The query direction C is
left implicit if it is irrelevant.
2.1 General Keyed Sponge
This work is concerned with the outer-keyed sponge and the full-keyed sponge: the former
absorbs data in the outer part only, the latter absorbs data over the entire state. We
can therefore neatly describe both in one go by considering a general keyed sponge that
operates with two capacities: cab for absorption and csq for squeezing. (Nevertheless, most
of the results in the remainder of the work concern the outer-keyed sponge.)
Let b, cab, csq, rab, rsq, k ∈ N be such that b = cab+rab = csq+rsq. Define λ := dk/rabe.
The general keyed sponge is a pseudorandom function based on a permutation pi ∈ perm(b)
that takes as input a key K ∈ {0, 1}k, an arbitrary-sized message M ∈ {0, 1}∗, and a
natural number ` ∈ N, and outputs a value z ∈ {0, 1}`:
GKSpi : (K,m, `) 7→ z ∈ {0, 1}` . (6)
The function is specified in Algorithm 1 and depicted (for integral λ := k/rab) in Figure 1.
The general keyed sponge construction covers the outer-keyed sponge OKSpi for
(cab, rab) = (csq, rsq) = (c, r). It covers the full-keyed sponge FKSpi for (cab, rab) = (0, b)
and (csq, rsq) = (c, r).
Note that the parameter λ indicates the number of invocations of pi to process the key.
As both the outer-keyed as the full-keyed sponge achieve a security level of roughly csq
at best, we can w.l.o.g. assume that k ≤ csq throughout. For FKS, this implies that we
always have λ = 1. For OKS, λ may be larger.
2.2 Yield and Configurations
For proper understanding of the security of OKS and FKS against key prediction security
as defined in Section 3, we will introduce the yield of a transcript of input-output tuples
of pi.
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Algorithm 1 General keyed sponge construction GKSpi
Input: K ∈ {0, 1}k, m ∈ {0, 1}∗, ` ∈ N
Output: z ∈ {0, 1}`
1: x1, . . . , xν ="rab(K ‖ m)
2: t = 0b
3: for i = 1, . . . , ν do
4: t = pi(t⊕ (xi ‖ 0cab))
5: z = dtersq
6: while |z| < ` do
7: t = pi(t)
8: z = z ‖ dtersq
9: return dze`
pi pi pi pi pi
• •
0
0
K1 Kλ m1 mµ z1 z2
cab cab cab cab csq csq
Figure 1: General keyed sponge for λ integral key blocks and µ message blocks. The
scheme covers the outer-keyed sponge (OKS) for cab = csq =: c and the full-keyed sponge
(FKS) for cab = 0 and csq =: c.
Definition 1. Consider GKS based on pi ∈ perm(b), and let Q be a transcript of pi.
The yield yieldcab,λ(Q) of Q is defined as the set of all keys K ∈ {0, 1}k for which there
exists a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that the first λ = dk/rabe evaluations of pi in line 4 of
Algorithm 1 are in Q.
In other words, yieldcab,λ(Q) is the set of keys for which the absorption in GKS can be
performed by only reading data from Q, hence, without evaluating pi.
The yield is closely related to a directed acyclic graph Gcab,λ(Q) = (V,A) defined as
follows. Vertex set2 V = {V0, V1, . . . , Vλ} consists of λ+ 1 layers, where
• V0 = {0b};
• For i = 1, . . . , λ: for any (s, t) ∈ Q and any L such that s⊕ (L ‖ 0cab) ∈ Vi−1, vertex
t is added to Vi and arrow s⊕ (L ‖ 0cab) L−−→ t with label L is added to A.
For given cab, λ, and Q, the size of the yield
∣∣yieldcab,λ(Q)∣∣ equals the number of paths
from V0 = {0b} to Vλ in Gcab,λ(Q).
A visualization of the graph is depicted in Figure 2. By construction, |Vi| ≤ |Q| for all
i = 1, . . . , λ. We highlight three further properties of the graph Gcab,λ(Q):
1. Two arrows departing from the same node, e.g., from u in Figure 2, happens if there
exist distinct L,L′ ∈ {0, 1}rab and distinct t, t′ ∈ {0, 1}b such that(
u⊕ (L ‖ 0cab), t), (u⊕ (L′ ‖ 0cab), t′) ∈ Q .
If the adversary makes a forward query, it can set such case with probability 1; if it
makes an inverse query, the case happens only if the query response s matches that
of an existing vertex u in the previous layer: bsccab = buccab ;
2Technically, V is a set of vertex sets.
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V0 V1 V2 V3
•0b
•u
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• v
•
•
Figure 2: Example graph Gcab,3(Q) consisting of 4 vertex layers. Edge and vertex labels
are omitted for clarity, except for vertices u and v for the sake of discussion.
2. Two arrows arriving at the same node, e.g., at v in Figure 2, happens if there exist
distinct L,L′ ∈ {0, 1}rab and distinct s, s′ ∈ {0, 1}b such that(
s⊕ (L ‖ 0cab), v), (s′ ⊕ (L′ ‖ 0cab), v) ∈ Q .
(These two queries are necessarily the same as pi is a permutation.) If the adversary
makes an inverse query, it can set such case with probability 1 (but the new edge
will likely not appear in the tree, as the tree is built up from 0b in V0); if it makes a
forward query, the case happens only if there exist two nodes in the previous layer
with equal capacity: bsccab = bs′ccab ;
3. As Q is a transcript of permutation queries, we can observe the following. In the
first of the above properties, the two vertices at which the arrows end, t and t′, must
necessarily be distinct; in the second case, the two vertices from which the arrows
depart, s and s′, must necessarily be distinct. We can particularly conclude that
there do not exist layer i ∈ {1, . . . , λ} and vertices vi−1 ∈ Vi−1 and vi ∈ Vi such that
Gcab,λ(Q) contains two arrows from vi−1 to vi.
We regularly talk about configurations of paths in said graph.
Definition 2. Consider GKS based on pi ∈ perm(b), and let Q be a transcript of pi.
Consider graph Gcab,λ(Q). The configuration of a path from v0 ∈ V0 to vλ ∈ Vλ is
defined as a tuple C = (C1, . . . , Cλ) ∈ {0, 1}λ, where Ci = 0 if the arrow from Vi−1 to Vi
corresponds to a forward query and Ci = 1 if it corresponds to an inverse query.
3 Key Prediction
For F ∈ {GKS,OKS,FKS}, we define key prediction security by the following experiment:
for a random permutation pi $←− perm(b), consider an adversary A that has oracle access
to pi±, meaning that it can query pi in forward and inverse direction. The adversary
can make a finite amount of queries to its oracle, which are summarized in a transcript
Q. Then, a key K $←− {0, 1}k is uniformly randomly drawn, and the adversary wins if
K ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q). Formally:
136 Key Prediction Security of Keyed Sponges
Definition 3. The key prediction security of F ∈ {GKS,OKS,FKS} against an adversary
A is defined as
Advkey-preF (A) = Pr
(
pi
$←− perm(b) , Q ← Api± , K $←− {0, 1}k : K ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q)
)
.
(7)
For N ≥ 0, we define by Advkey-preF (N) the maximum over all adversaries making N
queries to its oracle.
In above game, the key is only drawn after the adversary queries its oracle pi±. Its
attack tools are mere combinatorics: it maximizes its chances by maximizing the size of
the yield of the query transcript.
In the remainder of the section, we will focus on F = OKS, hence we write (cab, rab) =
(csq, rsq) =: (c, r). We will recall the bound of Gaži et al. [GPT15a,GPT15b] on Advkey-preOKS
in Section 3.1, and present our improved result in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 cover
the rationale and proof of our result, respectively. We discuss the possibility to generalize
our results to multi-key security in Section 3.5.
3.1 Bound of Gaži et al.
We briefly discuss the bound of Gaži et al. [GPT15b, Lemma 12] (full version of [GPT15a])
on Advkey-preOKS for integral λ := k/r, including a sketch of their proof in our convention and
notation. Afterwards, we will highlight several aspects of their analysis that contribute to
non-tightness of their bound.
Proposition 1 (Gaži et al. [GPT15b, Lemma 12]). Consider F = OKS for parameters
(b, c, r, k), where λ := k/r is integral. We have
Advkey-preF (N) ≤
{
N
2k , if λ = 1 ,
min
{
N2
2c +
N
2k ,
1
2b +
N2λ(3b−1)λ/2
2k/2
}
, if λ > 1 .
(8)
Proof (Proof (sketch)). In case of λ = 1, the adversary can make at mostN evaluations of pi
for different key guesses K1, . . . ,KN , hence can obtain yield of size at most
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ ≤
N . Alternatively, the claim follows from the fact that |V1| ≤ |Q| and that Gc,λ(Q) contains
no two arrows from 0b ∈ V0 to one and the same node in V1 (property 3 in Section 2.2).
The probability that a randomly selected key K $←− {0, 1}k is in the yield is thus at most
N/2k.
We sketch Gaži et al.’s approach for λ ≥ 2, assuming for simplicity that k = λ · r.
Consider any adversary making N queries, stored in a transcript Q. For α ∈ N, define
by mcα the event that there exist no α + 1 queries (si, ti)α+1i=1 to pi for which either all
queries are in forward direction and bt1cc = · · · = btα+1cc, or all are in inverse direction
and bs1cc = · · · = bsα+1cc. Obviously, Pr (¬mc1) ≤ N2/2c. In addition, Gaži et al. prove
using the Chernoff bound that:3
Pr (¬mc3b−1) ≤ 1/2b .
Gaži et al. subsequently prove that
mc1 =⇒
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ ≤ N , (9)
mc3b−1 =⇒
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ ≤ N2λ(3b− 1)λ/22k/2 , (10)
3There’s a small gap in the reasoning, namely that the Chernoff bound considers a sum of independent
events whereas in the current case a sum of inherently dependent events is considered.
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which in turn concludes the proof as the probability that a randomly selected key K $←−
{0, 1}k is in the yield is at most ∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ /2k. It thus remains to prove (9) and (10).
Regarding (9), mc1 implies that Gc,λ(Q) is a tree (cf. [GPT15b, Lemma 12]), and∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ is at most the number of nodes at layer λ: N . Regarding (10), as the
adversary only makes N queries, there are at most N possible nodes in Vλ at distance λ
from 0b. For any such node vλ, there are λ primitive queries connecting
0b ←→ · · · ←→ vλ ,
and each of these primitive queries could have been made in forward or in inverse direction.
Let C ∈ {0, 1}λ be any configuration, where Ci = 0 means that the arrow from Vi−1 to Vi
corresponds to a forward query and Ci = 1 that it corresponds to an inverse query (see
Definition 2). There are 2λ possible configurations. Starting from the end node, by mc3b−1
there are at most 3b− 1 arrows into vλ that correspond to forward queries to pi, but we do
not know anything about inverse queries, other than that the in-degree of vλ is at most
2r. This gives the following upper bound on the number of paths from 0b to (fixed) vλ for
fixed configuration C:
(3b− 1)λ−|C|(2r)|C| .
For |C| ≤ λ/2 this term is at most (3b− 1)λ/2(2r)λ/2 as 3b− 1 ≤ 2r. For |C| > λ/2 one
can reverse the reasoning, i.e., start from the first node 0b instead of end node vλ. This
likewise gives upper bound
(3b− 1)|C|(2r)λ−|C| ,
which for |C| > λ/2 is also at most(3b − 1)λ/2(2r)λ/2 as 3b − 1 ≤ 2r. Summing over all
possible configurations C and all possible end nodes, we obtain∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ ≤ N2λ(3b− 1)λ/2(2r)λ/2 = N2λ(3b− 1)λ/22k/2 ,
as k = λ · r.
Besides the minor and insignificant glitch that the Chernoff bound is applied to the
sum of dependent events, the proof has two shortcomings that yield non-tightness of the
bound:
(i) The proof approach selects an end node and then upper bounds the amount of vertices
at the different layers. The selection of the end node (N possibilities), however,
already fixes the last vertex. A single query may connect multiple elements from
Vλ−1 with Vλ, hence one cannot just assume that fixing the end node gives one arrow
“for free,” but it still fixes the inner part of the node at layer Vλ−1;
(ii) Assuming mc3b−1, there is no 3b-fold inner collision, and no more than 3b− 1 forward
queries that map to the same node in a layer Vi; yet for the inverse queries Gaži et al.
cannot rely on mc3b−1 and resort to the fact that any node has at most 2r incoming
arrows. It is intuitively appealing to say that also for inverse queries the number of
useful arrows is at most 3b− 1, where useful refers to the fact that the path should
lead to root 0b ∈ V0.
3.2 Improved Key Prediction Security
We derive the following improved bound for key prediction security. The bound for λ = 1
of Proposition 1 is already tight, and we restrict ourselves to the case of λ > 1.
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Figure 3: For parameter set (b, c, r, k) = (192, 128, 64, 128), the bound of Theorem 1 for
α = 50, 52, 54, 56, 64, 128 (from right to left).
Theorem 1. Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k), where λ := dk/re > 1. Let
α > λ be a natural number. Let 0 ≤ N ≤ 2b−1. We have
Advkey-preF (N) ≤
(2α)λ−1N
2k + λ2
λ22c
(
2eN∗
2cα
)α/λ
, (11)
where N∗ = max{N,λ2(λ−1)r}.
The proof will be given in Section 3.4, preceded by its rationale in Section 3.3.
Parameter α is a threshold: the first term increases whereas the second term decreases
for increasing α. By taking α/λ ≥ c, we obtain that 2λ22c ≤ 2k22c ≤ 23c ≤ 8α/λ, and
above bound simplifies to
Advkey-preF (N) ≤
(2α)λ−1N
2k + λ
(
16eN∗
2cα
)α/λ
.
For N close to 2k, N∗ = N and the first term dominates the equation. For smaller N ,
N∗ = λ2(λ−1)r, and the second term dominates.
For the case of (b, c, r, k) = (192, 128, 64, 128), with λ = 2, the graph in Figure 3 plots
the bound of Theorem 1 for various choices of α. One sees that taking α ≥ 2c is convenient
for making the bound simple, but it is a rough estimate. Better choices of α, less than 2c,
yield a stronger bound. The first term of (11) dominates as long as α ≥ 54. For α ≤ 53 the
second term in (11) starts to dominate. The graph in Figure 3 depicts it well for α = 52:
it follows the linear behavior of the first term, until at some point the exponential term of
(11) becomes dominating. Numerical computation shows that for α = 54, the bound of
(11) equals 1 for N ≈ 2121.25.
For the example outlined above, the bound of Gaži et al. of Proposition 1 equals 1
for N2 + N ≈ 2128. The best known attack is the generic one, that fixes λ − 1 blocks
K1, . . . ,Kλ−1 and varies Kλ: this procedure renders a yield of size exactly N − (λ − 1)
and succeeds in predicting the key with probability (N − (λ− 1))/2k. A comparison of the
old bound, the new bound (for α = 54), and the best known attack is given in Figure 4.
The bound of Theorem 1 permits a small loss in comparison with the best known attack,
which comes from the accidental event of multi-collisions on the inner part of pi. The term
increases exponentially in λ, which is due to the fact that multi-collisions could occur at
every evaluation of pi, and they can amplify each other. In the end, however, it only yields
a small loss.
Bart Mennink 139
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
232 264 2121 2128
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
N
old bound
new bound (alpha = 54)
best attack
Figure 4: For parameter set (b, c, r, k) = (192, 128, 64, 128), the old bound of Proposition 1,
the new bound of Theorem 1 for α = 54, and the best known attack (from left to right).
The N axis is in logarithmic scale.
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where w ∈ {0, 1}c is fixed.
V0 V1 V2
•
•
•
•
config. 00:
config. 01:
config. 10:
config. 11:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
(b) Possible configurations for the directions
of the queries. A circle © indicates that a
fixed inner value must be hit.
Figure 5: Graph and configurations for the rationale of Section 3.3.
3.3 Rationale Behind Theorem 1
The proof, at a high level, relies on the observation that any path from V0 to a fixed vertex
vλ ∈ Vλ must contain at least one collision on the inner part: either between a query and
0b ∈ V0 or vλ, or between two queries at any layer in V1, . . . , Vλ−1. In addition, it uses
that for a fixed inner part, there are at most min{N, 2r} queries.
The proof is easiest understood by considering λ = 3. In this case, we consider graph
Gc,3(Q) consisting of four layers V0, V1, V2, V3. The first step in the proof will be to fix the
last vertex v3 ∈ V3. There are at most N choices, as this choice is equivalent to fixing
(s, v3) ∈ Q. The choice also fixes the inner part of the nodes in V2 under consideration: the
query links V2 with V3 only for nodes v2 such that bv2cc = bscc. Define the fixed capacity
by w := bscc ∈ {0, 1}c. We henceforth have to focus on paths from 0b ∈ V0 to any v2 ∈ V2,
where bv2cc = w. See also Figure 5a. Any of these paths fits one of the four configurations
of Figure 5b.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that Q contains no (α+ 1)-fold inner collision (in
either forward or inverse direction). For configuration 00 of Figure 5b, we have at most α
arrows from V1 to V2, each of which fixes the inner part of the node in V1, yielding at most
α arrows from V0 to V1; see also the circle indications in the figure. We have obtained that
there are at most α2 paths that obey to configuration 00. Likewise, there are at most α2
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paths for configurations 10 and 11, using that the node in V0, 0b, has its inner part fixed:
0c. What remains is configuration 01: the inner parts of the values at layers V0 and V2 are
fixed, and thus there are at most min{N, 2r} queries in Q that could depart from V0 in
forward direction and V2 in inverse direction. The expected numbers of collisions in the
middle is
min{N, 2r}2
2c .
By the Markov inequality, more than α2 paths exist with probability at most
min{N, 2r}2
2cα2 . (12)
This gives
∣∣yieldc,3(Q)∣∣ = 4α2N , except with probability (12) and the probability that
there exists an (α+ 1)-fold inner collision. Above reasoning also pinpoints the technical
difference between our proof and that of Gaži et al. (Proposition 1): we more accurately
bound the number of paths in order to obtain a tighter yield.
Unfortunately, above reasoning is not entirely correct: the evaluation of configuration
01 has to be performed for all possible w ∈ {0, 1}c, as the adversary can freely choose the
query for the last layer. Multiplying (12) by 2c does not help; to the contrary, the bound
becomes meaningless. Instead, configuration 01 will also be analyzed by relying on the
non-existence of (α+ 1)-fold inner collisions: any hit adds at most α solutions.
Additional issues surface if we extend the reasoning to larger values of λ: configurations
like 001 (0c → · → · ← w) or 0101 (0c → · ← · → · ← w) appear. To resolve these issues,
a recursive reasoning (in λ) will be performed.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k), where λ := dk/re > 1, and let pi $←− perm(b).
Consider any adversary A with two-sided query access to pi. We will record the query
history in a transcript Q, where we keep track of the query direction using a bit C ∈ {0, 1},
i.e., a tuple (C, s, t) ∈ Q is made in forward direction if C = 0 and inverse direction if
C = 1. Associated with Q is graph Gc,λ(Q) = (V,A) as defined in Section 2.2.
3.4.1 Defining Auxiliary Events
Let α > 0 be an integral threshold. At the core of our proof is the event mc, that bounds
the maximum size of a multi-collision in Q. We define
mc = mc+ ∧mc− , (13)
where
mc+ : max
w∈{0,1}c
∣∣∣{(0, s, t) ∈ Q ∣∣∣ btcc = w}∣∣∣ ≤ α , (14)
mc− : max
v∈{0,1}c
∣∣∣{(1, s, t) ∈ Q ∣∣∣ bscc = v}∣∣∣ ≤ α . (15)
The event mc corresponds to mcα in the proof of Proposition 1, be it with α omitted as
subscript.
The proof will, implicitly, be performed by induction on λ. For i = 1, . . . , λ − 1, we
define the event chi, a condition on chains of length i, as follows:
chi : max
C∈{0,1}i
max
v,w∈{0,1}c
∣∣∣{(C1, s1, t1), . . . , (Ci, si, ti) ∈ Q ∣∣∣
bs1cc = v ∧
(btjcc = bsj+1cc)i−1j=1 ∧ bticc = w}∣∣∣ ≤ αi . (16)
Bart Mennink 141
In other words, chi is the maximum number of solutions to
v
C1←−→ · C2←−→ · · · Ci←−→ w , (17)
maximized over all possible configurations C = (C1, . . . , Ci) ∈ {0, 1}i (the label on the
arrow indicates the configuration of the query, see also Definition 2) and start and end
nodes v, w ∈ {0, 1}c. There is an important difference between ch1 (or chi in general)
on the one hand and mc on the other hand: in ch1 the inner values of both sides of the
path are fixed, whereas in mc only one side is fixed. Nevertheless, mc⇒ ch1 by definition.
Furthermore, for i = λ− 1 the proof needs chλ−1 only for v = 0c, but we have opted to
include the general event for simplicity of argument.
3.4.2 Main Step
The main step in bounding Advkey-preF (N) is the following:
Advkey-preF (N) ≤ Pr
(
K
$←− {0, 1}k : K ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q)
∣∣∣ chλ−1)+Pr (¬chλ−1) . (18)
Note that this probability reduction only uses event chλ−1 explicitly: under the condition
that this event holds, a proper bound on
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ will be derived. This derivation, i.e.,
a bound on the first probability of (18), will be given in Section 3.4.3. The analysis that
chλ−1 is violated, the second probability of (18), is inductive, and relies on the condition
that none of the “shorter” events chλ−2 ∧ · · · ∧ ch1 ∧ mc is violated. A bound on this
probability will be derived in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Bounding the Yield
Fix any vertex vλ ∈ Vλ. There are at most N choices as this choice is equivalent to fixing
(s, vλ) ∈ Q, and it also fixes the inner part w := bscc ∈ {0, 1}c for the node at shore Vλ−1.
We thus have to focus on paths from 0b ∈ V0 to any vλ−1 ∈ Vλ−1 with bvλ−1cc = w. Let
C ∈ {0, 1}λ−1 be any configuration. By chλ−1, there are at most αλ−1 paths from 0c to
the fixed w for this particular configuration. Summing over all possible configurations and
all possible choices vλ, we obtain that
chλ−1 =⇒
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ ≤ (2α)λ−1N . (19)
We obtain for the first probability of (18):
Pr
(
K
$←− {0, 1}k : K ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q)
∣∣∣ chλ−1) = ∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣2k ≤ (2α)λ−1N2k .
3.4.4 Analyzing Auxiliary Events
It remains to analyze the second probability of (18). By basic probability theory,
Pr (¬chλ−1) ≤ Pr (¬mc) +
λ−1∑
i=1
Pr (¬chi | chi−1 ∧ · · · ∧ ch1 ∧mc) . (20)
We will analyze the probabilities in Lemmas 1 and 2 below. After the proof of Lemma 2,
we will combine the results into a clean and concise bound on (20).
Lemma 1. Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k). Let α > λ := dk/re > 1 be
a natural number. Consider any adversary playing the key prediction security game of
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Definition 3 against F = OKS, that makes N ≤ 2b−1 queries recorded in a transcript Q.
Then,
Pr (¬mc) ≤ 2 · 2c
(
2eN
2cα
)α
, (21)
where the event mc is defined in Section 3.4.1.
Proof (Proof (of Lemma 1)). Without loss of generality, consider mc+. Fix any w ∈
{0, 1}c. Any forward query (0, s, t) satisfies btcc = w with probability at most 2r/(2b−N),
as the response is randomly drawn from a set of size at least 2b −N and at most 2r of
those fulfill the condition. More than α satisfy the condition with probability at most4(
N
α
)(
2r
2b −N
)α
≤
(
2eN
2cα
)α
,
using a well-known upper bound on binomial coefficients, and the assumption thatN ≤ 2b−1.
The proof is completed by summing over all possible w ∈ {0, 1}c and by taking into account
mc− as well (cf. (13)).
Lemma 2. Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k). Let α > λ := dk/re > 1 be a
natural number. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , λ− 1}. Consider any adversary playing the key prediction
security game of Definition 3 against F = OKS, that makes N ≤ 2b−1 queries recorded in
a transcript Q. Then,
Pr (¬chi | chi−1 ∧ · · · ∧ ch1 ∧mc) ≤
0 , for i = 1 ,i2i22c ( 2ei2ir2cα )α/i , for i = 2, . . . , λ− 1 , (22)
where the events chi (i = 1, . . . , λ− 1) and mc are defined in Section 3.4.1.
Proof (Proof (of Lemma 2)). We have mc ⇒ ch1 by definition, and focus on the case of
arbitrary i > 1. Fix any configuration C ∈ {0, 1}i and any v, w ∈ {0, 1}c, in total 2i22c
possible choices. We aim to prove that the number of solutions to (17) is at most αi. To
the contrary, assume it is more than αi. Then, by the pigeonhole principle, there must
be an index j ∈ {1, . . . , i} such that more than αi/i solutions are constituted with the
winning query, i.e., the query that completes the chain, occurring at position j.5 Without
loss of generality (the argument is fully symmetric), assume that Cj = 0, i.e., that it is a
forward query.
As v ∈ {0, 1}c is fixed, there are at most 2jr possible values s ∈ {0, 1}b at distance
j − 1 from v, i.e., the adversary can make at most min{N, 2jr} attempts. As w ∈ {0, 1}c
is fixed, there are at most 2(i−j)r possible inner parts x such that a path
x
Cj+1←−−−→ · · · Ci←−→ w
can be constituted from the transcript. The new forward query hits any of these inner
parts with probability at most 2(i−j)r · 2r/(2b − N). By chj−1 and chi−j , any such hit
adds at most αj−1 · αi−j = αi−1 solutions. In order to get more than αi/i solutions, there
must be more than α/i collisions, which happens with probability at most(
min{N, 2jr}
α/i
)(
2(i−j)r · 2r
2b −N
)α/i
≤
(
2ei2ir
2cα
)α/i
, (23)
4In the bound we could take α+ 1 instead of α, but have opted not to do so for simplicity.
5It could be that this query occurs at multiple positions in the chain, but this does not invalidate the
reasoning due to generous counting.
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again by bounding the binomial coefficient and using the assumption that N ≤ 2b−1, and
where we recall that the adversary has only min{N, 2jr} ≤ 2jr shots to success. The proof
is completed by summing over all possible configurations C ∈ {0, 1}i, start and end nodes
v, w ∈ {0, 1}c, and positions of the winning query j ∈ {1, . . . , i}.
From (20) and Lemmas 1 and 2 we immediately obtain, using that α > λ,
Pr (¬chλ−1) ≤ 2 · 2c
(
2eN
2cα
)α
+
λ−1∑
i=2
i2i22c
(
2ei2ir
2cα
)α/i
≤ 2 · 2c
(
2eN
2cα
)α
+
λ−1∑
i=2
λ2i22c
(
2eλ2(λ−1)r
2cα
)α/λ
≤
λ−1∑
i=1
λ2i22c
(
2eN∗
2cα
)α/λ
≤ λ2λ22c
(
2eN∗
2cα
)α/λ
, (24)
where N∗ = max{N,λ2(λ−1)r}. Slight improvements in the bound could be achieved, at
the cost of readability penalties, in the derivation of Lemma 2 and in the bounding of (24)
above.
3.5 Generalization to Multi-Key Security
It is straightforward to generalize our analysis to multi-key security. First, to generalize
Definition 3, one would consider K1, . . . ,Ku
$←− {0, 1}k, where u ∈ N is the number of
users, and the adversary wins if Ki ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , u}:
Definition 4. Let u ∈ N. The u-key prediction security of F ∈ {GKS,OKS,FKS} against
an adversary A is defined as
Advu-key-preF (A) = Pr
(
pi
$←− perm(b) , Q ← Api± , K1, . . . ,Ku $←− {0, 1}k :
∃i ∈ {1, . . . , u} such that Ki ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q)
)
.
(25)
For N ≥ 0, we define by Advu-key-preF (N) the maximum over all adversaries making N
queries to its oracle.
Theorem 1 and the proof likewise generalize straightforwardly.
Theorem 2. Let u ∈ N. Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k), where λ :=
dk/re > 1. Let α > λ be a natural number. Let 0 ≤ N ≤ 2b−1. We have
Advu-key-preF (N) ≤ u ·
(2α)λ−1N
2k + λ2
λ22c
(
2eN∗
2cα
)α/λ
, (26)
where N∗ = max{N,λ2(λ−1)r}.
Proof. The core of the proof of Theorem 1 is about deriving an upper bound on
∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣.
Once this bound is derived — the derivation of Section 3.4 carries over verbatim — any of
the u keys is in the yield with probability at most u · ∣∣yieldc,λ(Q)∣∣ /2k ≤ u · (2α)λ−1N2k .
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4 Application to Keyed Sponge and Duplex
Keyed sponges are evaluated in a PRF security model. In more detail, let RO∞ : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∞ be a function that for every inputm defines an infinitely large string of random bits,
and define RO : {0, 1}∗ × N→ {0, 1}N as a function that on input of (m, `) ∈ {0, 1}∗ × N
outputs dRO∞(m)e`. Abusing notation, write ro(∗,N) for the set of all such functions RO.
For a random permutation pi $←− perm(b), key K $←− {0, 1}k, and RO $←− ro(∗,N), consider
an adversary A that has oracle access to either (FpiK , pi±) or (RO, pi±). It succeeds if it
manages to determine (with high probability) the world it is conversing with. Formally:
Definition 5. The PRF security of F ∈ {GKS,OKS,FKS} against an adversary A is
defined as
AdvprfF (A) = Pr
(
pi
$←− perm(b) , K $←− {0, 1}k : 1← AFpiK ,pi±
)
−Pr
(
pi
$←− perm(b) , RO $←− ro(∗,N) : 1← ARO,pi±
)
. (27)
For M,N ≥ 0, we define by AdvprfF (M,N) the maximum over all adversaries with query
complexity M to the first oracle (in terms of the number of underlying primitive calls)
and N to the second oracle.
A bound on the PRF security of FKS was derived by Mennink et al. [MRV15], but we
are mostly concerned with the outer keyed sponge. For OKS, an earlier proof appeared
by Bertoni et al. [BDPV11c]. Andreeva et al. [ADMV15] improved the analysis and
generalized it to multi-key security. Naito and Yasuda [NY16] derived a bound that is
independent of the message length. The improvements in these bounds come at the cost
of defining extra security parameters, such as the multiplicity, the number of oracles, the
number of construction queries, and the maximum length of each construction query. As
our security model considers an adversary whose complexity is solely measured by M and
N , we discard most of the sophisticated improvements in [ADMV15,NY16] and consider a
simplified bound. In addition, we modernize the bound using the key prediction security
notion of Definition 3.
Theorem 3 (Andreeva et al. [ADMV15] and Naito and Yasuda [NY16], simplified).
Consider F = OKS for parameters (b, c, r, k). Let M,N ≥ 0. We have
AdvprfF (M,N) ≤ const1 ·
M2
2c + const2 ·
MN
2c +Adv
key-pre
F (N) . (28)
In [ADMV15], the constant terms satisfy const1 = 1 and const2 ≤ 4. Also for the bound
of [NY16] the constant terms are reasonably small, but as their analysis is more involved, a
neat approximation for these terms cannot be easily derived. The simplifications we have
put through from [ADMV15,NY16] only affect the fractions in (28) and do not affect the
point we are making with regard to the remaining term in (28). This term Advkey-preF (N)
in turn corresponds to a specific bad event in the analyses in [ADMV15,NY16]: assuming
that the adversary never makes the primitive queries related to the absorption of the key,
the state after the absorption of the key has a sufficient amount of entropy. Both Andreeva
et al. [ADMV15, Lemma 2] and Naito and Yasuda [NY16, Theorem 2] rely on the bound
of Gaži et al. [GPT15a,GPT15b] on Advkey-preF (N): the bound expressed in Proposition 1.
Our new result of Theorem 1 directly improves over the bounds from Andreeva et al. and
Naito and Yasuda, and confirms that a shorter key can be taken to achieve the same level
of security.
On passing, we remark that the result has comparable impact to the keyed du-
plex [BDPV11a], a sponge-related construction well-suited for authenticated encryption.
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It is a stateful construction that has a “duplexing interface:” it gets as input a data block
of size r bits, transforms the state using a permutation, and returns part of the outer
part of the state. It comes with an outer-keyed flavor [BDPV11a] as well as a full-keyed
flavor [MRV15,DMV17], and the keyed sponge bounds are known to be transferable to the
duplex (and vice versa) up to some degree. Crucial to this transition is that in the keyed
duplex, the key absorption occurs with no intermediate output of the outer part, and thus
occurs in a full-/outer-keyed sponge fashion. In this way, the key prediction term in the
duplex bounds is also Advkey-preF (N), where F ∈ {OKS,FKS}, i.e., the bound derived in
Theorem 1.
Finally, the generic security results on HMAC-SHA-3 [NW16] and the sandwich
sponge [Nai16] rely on the key prediction security term of Gaži et al. in the exact same
way, and our new bound immediately improves their results.
5 Note on Key Recovery
In a similar vein as in Section 3, one can define the key recovery security of F ∈
{GKS,OKS,FKS}. For a random permutation pi $←− perm(b) and key K $←− {0, 1}k,
consider an adversary A that has oracle access to (FpiK , pi±). The adversary can make a
limited amount of queries to its oracles, summarized in a transcript Q, and afterwards it
outputs a key K ′ ∈ {0, 1}k. It wins if K ′ ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q) and FpiK(·) = FpiK′(·). Formally:
Definition 6. The key recovery security of F ∈ {GKS,OKS,FKS} against an adversary
A is defined as
Advkey-recF (A) = Pr
(
pi
$←− perm(b) , K $←− {0, 1}k , (K ′,Q)← AFpiK ,pi± :
K ′ ∈ yieldcab,λ(Q) ∧ FpiK(·) = FpiK′(·)
)
. (29)
For M,N ≥ 0, we define by Advkey-recF (M,N) the maximum over all adversaries with
query complexity M to the first oracle (in terms of the number of underlying primitive
calls) and N to the second oracle.
In other words, key recovery security differs from key prediction security in that the
adversary has access to the keyed construction FpiK .
One may argue that key recovery is a more meaningful notion to consider than key
prediction. However, close inspection at how a key recovery security proof would look like
reveals that the key recovery security of OKS is very close to its PRF security. To wit, the
core ingredients of the PRF security bound of OKS (Theorem 3) are (i) the event of two
evaluations of pi imposed by F±K with the same inner part, (ii) a primitive query to pi± and
an evaluation of pi imposed by F±K with the same inner part, and (iii) guessing/predicting
the key. These parts are represented by the three terms in the bound of Theorem 3 in
equal order.
Obviously, one way to recover the key is to predict it (part (iii) of the above). Now,
suppose the adversary makes a query to pi± whose inner part is equal to the inner part of
an evaluation of pi imposed by F±K (part (ii) of the above). In this case, the adversary can
back-track the sponge to obtain tλ, the state of the sponge after the absorption of the last
key block. Once it knows tλ, depending on λ it can learn (part of) the key. Regarding
part (i): if two evaluations of pi imposed by F±K have the same inner part, the adversary
can use this information to distinguish the scheme from a random function but it has no
means to use this information to recover the key.
To summarize, the key recovery security bound would be constituted of parts (iii)
and (ii) of the PRF security bound. Part (i) is minor compared with (ii), as the oﬄine
complexity is typically higher than the online complexity. We can thus conclude that the
key recovery security of OKS is very close to its PRF security.
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